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Abstract
This article investigates prices versus quantities when regulation generates contestable rents. A
two-stage process is outlined where, in stage one, a politician selects a policy level in the presence
of uncertainty. In stage two, players invest in distributional rent seeking, i.e., rent-capturing
activities to obtain the rents generated from regulation. A clear distinction is derived between
prices, revenue-raising quantities as well as non-revenue-raising quantities. The politician’s payoff
as well as equilibrium policy level are compared within a number of institutional environments,
which take into account the politician’s preferences over rent-seeking transfers and social welfare.
A key determinant is the interaction between the efficiency of rent transfer and the composition
of rent seekers within the economy.
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1 Introduction
The decision to select a regulatory instrument is a contentious aspect of environmental policy
debates.1 This controversy arises from the fact that there are many legitimate grounds to favor
a specific instrument. For example, comparisons can be made with respect to cost effectiveness,
political feasibility, incentives to innovate, revenue-raising capabilities, efficiency under uncertainty,
among others. Two of the most prominent components within this debate are the political economy
aspects of regulation and efficiency under uncertainty.
In terms of the political economy of regulation, many economists have argued in favor of
implementing prices as quantity regulation generates a rent-seeking culture. For example, the typical
argument, as highlighted in Nordhaus (2007, p. 39), suggests “[q]uantity-type systems are much
more susceptible to corruption than price-type regimes. An emissions-trading system creates valuable
assets in the form of tradable emissions permits” whereas “a price approach gives less room for
corruption because it does not create artificial scarcities, monopolies, or rents....[t]here is no new
rent seeking opportunity” (Nordhaus, 2007, p. 39).2 Although, prima facie, this argument appears
plausible as rents generated from quantity instruments do exist; this perspective fails to account
for rents generated under a price mechanism. In particular, price regulation (and revenue-raising
quantity regulation) generate rents in the form of public funds that may be contested by society.
∗E-mail: i.mackenzie@uq.edu.au
1For example, continual debate exists in the US over whether prices or quantities (if any) should be implemented to
control carbon dioxide (e.g., Goulder and Schein, 2013). Further, in Australia—where both a carbon tax and cap-and-trade
scheme were legislated—an extensive debate covered their relative merits (e.g., Garnaut, 2008) prior to the policies being
repealed in 2014.
2For similar arguments see, for example, Stavins (1998), Cramton and Kerr (2002), and Hepburn et al. (2006). Another
argument extends this perspective by suggesting that the only politically feasible instrument is a non-revenue-raising
quantity mechanism—such as freely allocated permits—as this reduces the financial burden on regulated entities (e.g.,
Goulder and Parry, 2008)
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Thus to fully consider the political aspects of prices and quantities, one must investigate how the
generation of regulatory rents from prices and quantities affects the preferred choice of instrument.
To compare the political aspects of instruments one must consider not only the rents that are
generated but how these are affected by realistic regulatory environments. One such environment
consists of a regulator experiencing uncertainty over the effectiveness and social optimality of
their proposed policy. Taking uncertainty into account, Weitzman (1974), Adar and Griffin (1976),
Fishelson (1976) and Roberts and Spence (1976), provide formal analysis over whether prices or
quantities are the preferred instrument to maximize expected social welfare. At its core the prices
versus quantities paradigm hinges on the relative slopes of an economy’s cost and benefit functions
as well as the structure of uncertainty. Yet the prices versus quantities framework abstracts from the
political aspects of regulation, which is important if we want to understand how and why certain
policies are chosen and implemented.
Combining aspects of political economy with policy choice under uncertainty provides a novel
structure to compare the desirability of policy instruments. With such an approach numerous policy
questions can be asked, such as, how does the prices versus quantities paradigm change when
political economy aspects are taken into account? How do politicians decide on a preferred regulatory
structure given these rents are contested within society? How does the existence of contestable rents
distort the politician’s choice of policy level?
To answer these questions, this article investigates the prices versus quantities paradigm when
there exists rent seeking over regulatory rents. The model comprises of two stages. In the first stage,
under uncertainty, a politician sets a policy level for either prices or quantities à la Weitzman (1974).
In the second stage, players within the economy invest in distributional rent seeking to appropriate
the rents generated from the implemented regulation. This may include activities such as lobbying,
monetary transfers/favors, corruption, and so on. Further, the article allows for a host of alternative
institutional environments: the politician may select a policy level based on alternative weights
between social welfare and rent seeking. This article can thus include cases where the politician solely
cares about social welfare as well as other extreme cases, where they care only about rent-seeking
transfers or treat this activity as purely wasteful.
In comparing prices versus quantities a distinction is made regarding the source and contestability
of the rents. More precisely, a useful distinction—used throughout this article—is whether the
instruments generate revenue or not. Non-revenue-raising quantity mechanisms, such as freely
allocated permits, create rents in the form of a fixed supply of tradable permits. What is generally
observed in reality is that the distribution of permits is usually only contested by the regulated entities.
Contrast this with mechanisms that generate revenues, such as taxes and quantity auctions. In such a
case the collection of revenue is usually centralized, which allows members from the whole of society
to capture these rents via investments in rent-seeking activities.
Another distinction in the level of contestability occurs due to specific institutional environments.
For rents generated under non-revenue-raising quantity mechanisms, it is likely that rent transfers
are costless: a finite number of permits are created and distributed without loss of rents within the
bureaucratic system. Contrast this with revenue-raising instruments, where it is likely that the process
of collecting revenue will generate revenue loss (marginal cost of public funds) and, as a result,
lower the level of net rent that is contestable. For example, bureaucratic friction may exist, which
reduces the potential size of contestable regulatory rents: revenue generated is rarely ever returned
to the economy without revenue loss. Further, if elements of the revenue are a priori earmarked for
specific purposes, this will also reduce the level of rent contestability. A final possibility is that the
revenue-based rents provide benefits over-and-above the size of the revenue. This reflects the idea
that a revenue-recycling effect exists, where the rents may be distributed within the economy so as to
reduce distortionary taxation for rent winners.
A key component of this model is the existence of rent-capturing activities. In particular, players
invest in sunk effort to appropriate the rents generated from regulation. This is achieved by allowing
players to participate in a contest where a player’s share (winning probability) of the rent is based on
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their sunk rent-seeking investments relative to total outlays. Clear anecdotal evidence exists for the
presence of distributional rent seeking. Rent seeking over freely allocated permits is commonplace in
the U.S. Acid Rain Program (Ellerman et al., 2000) as well as the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS) (Zapfel, 2007).3 In particular, Ellerman et al. (2000) provide clear evidence that
rent seeking occurred over the distribution of pollution permits under the 1990 Title IV of the Clean
Air Act Amendments. In fact, the political process was entirely distributional. This occurred due
to a specific section of the legislation. Under Section 403 (a) of the 1990 Title IV of the Clean
Air Act Amendments a ‘ratchet’ provision was created that ensured that any political lobbying over
the legislation would not affect the aggregate level of emissions. This was achieved by reducing
each state’s final level emissions pro rata to meet the agreed target level. Evidence of rent seeking
over public funds is also frequently observed, for example, Aidt (2010) provide details of how
the revenue from green taxes have been appropriated by members of society. Further, within the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)—a cap-and-trade scheme regulating most Northeastern
US states—it has been observed that some states have diverted auction revenues away from their
intended recipients. For example, since 2009 New York State has diverted revenue away from energy
efficiency projects towards reducing their budget deficit, the so-called ‘Deficit Reduction Plan (DRP)
Transfer’.4
Combining a model of prices versus quantities with distributional rent seeking, this article shows
the existence of rent seeking over regulatory rents significantly alters the politician’s preferred
choices and policy level. Thus this provides a positive analysis as to why certain polices are more
likely to be implemented and how the policy target is chosen. The results within this article show
that if a politician has equal weighting between social welfare and rent-seeking transfers then a
separation exists between revenue-raising and non-revenue-raising quantities. In particular this
article shows cases where non-revenue-raising quantities may actually be preferred over revenue-
raising mechanisms: something frequently observed in reality (e.g., Goulder and Parry, 2008).5
Further, if the politician is solely concerned about maximizing rent transfers, then no difference
exists between revenue-raising instruments but there continues to be a difference associated with
non-revenue-raising instruments. In particular the key determinant is the relationship between the
level of contestability (due to bureaucratic friction, earmarking, and the revenue-recycling effect)
and the composition of rent seekers within the regulated industry as well as the wider economy.
1.1 Related literature
The approach detailed in this article advances two distinct literature fields; namely, the political
economy of environmental policy and prices versus quantities. The literature on the political economy
of environmental policy is vast (see Oates and Portney, 2003). In this literature there are two main
branches of exploration. The first branch focuses on the endogenous determination of environmental
policy (e.g., Fredriksson, 1997; Aidt, 1998; Aidt and Dutta, 2004; Lai, 2007; Aidt, 2010). Most follow
frameworks associated with Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2002), which establishes a common-
agency model where the lobbyists are principals and the government is the agent.6 Lobbyists
provide a menu of contributions for a government’s policy decisions. The government then decides
3See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap/index_en.htm
4See http://www.nyserda.ny.gov/-/media/Files/Publications/Energy-Analysis/RGGI/2009-Q4-RGGI-Status-Report.pdf.
5Indeed a common argument for the non-revenue-raising instruments being so frequently used is that it is the ‘path of
least resistance’ as the regulated entities try to persuade the regulator to avoid raising revenue (Buchanan and Tullock,
1975). In the framework of Buchanan and Tullock (1975) firms prefer direct control over taxes as this provides a form of
monopoly rent whereas society prefers the tax due to the revenue-raising capabilities. It is argued, then, that direct control
occurs as the firms are more organized in lobbying the government than society.
6Finkelshtain and Kislev (1997) use the model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) to compare tax and quota regimes.
They find that the relative difference between taxes and quotas depends on the elasticity of the demand, supply of the
product and the number of politically organized firms. Their approach, however, is not concerned with uncertainty of
control costs nor the revenue-raising capabilities of regulatory regimes, which is central to the argument about regulatory
instrument choice presented in this article.
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a policy level based on their weighted sum of social welfare and political contributions. Thus the
policy level is determined, in part, by lobbying activity. Although this literature provides a solid
foundation to explain how environmental policy is determined, it often pays less attention to the
distributional conflict that arises in environmental policy. In particular, it is often ignored that there
exists bifurcation in the policy process, where, first, the policy is decided and then second, the details
of the policy (i.e., the distributional components) are separately determined. The second branch
focuses on this distributional conflict within environmental policy (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1975;
Dijkstra, 1998; Malueg and Yates, 2006; Dijkstra, 2007; Hanley and MacKenzie, 2010; MacKenzie
and Ohndorf, 2012). One can view this approach, in some respects, as the opposite of the first
branch: the lobbyists are the agents and the government is the principal.7 Stemming from the early
work of Tullock (1980), this literature views the establishment of environmental policy as a basis for
the creation of rents that are distributional in nature.8 In this approach, political influence occurs
due to the investment in sunk costs, and, as a result, much use is made of contest theory to analyze
these problems. Although fixed rents and the associated distributional conflict do exist, it would
appear that these games are often zero-sum and the costs involved are less significant than externality
(policy-level) distortions.9 As such, given there are inevitable winners and losers with all policies, this
literature usually only focuses on the distributional process and ignores the endogenous formation of
policy.
This article, in contrast, shows that the existence of distributional rent seeking alters the politi-
cian’s preferred choice of instrument as well as the equilibrium policy level. This, then, bridges the
gap between the two branches of political economy literature by providing a positive analysis of
the distributional process. In comparison to these branches of literature, the results of this article
show that policy distortions can result from an inherent distributional game rather than an explicit
lobbying process over the policy level. By deliberately abstracting from direct lobbying over the
policy level, the model shows how distributional conflict alone can alter the prices versus quantities
paradigm. Thus the approach presented here provides a novel method to analyze political influence
under prices versus quantities.
The second literature field is prices versus quantities. Many additional directions have extended
the core result of Weitzman (1974). Attention has been given to stock pollutants and alternative
uncertainty structures (Stavins, 1996; Hoel and Karp, 2001, 2002; Pizer, 2002; Newell and Pizer,
2003; Wirl, 2012), tradable and bankable quantities (Williams III, 2002; Fell et al., 2012), technology
choice (Krysiak, 2008; Storrøsten, 2014; D’Amato and Dijkstra, 2015), incomplete enforcement issues
(Montero, 2002; Rohling and Ohndorf, 2012), as well as the analysis of second-best settings (Schöb,
1996; Quirion, 2004). The majority of this literature finds similarities with the core result: the most
important determinants of instrument choice are the relative slopes of the marginal cost and benefit
functions. A key weakness in this literature, however, is that it abstracts from political influence. Yet
without investigating the impact of political influence on a regulator’s instrument choice, very little
can be said about prices versus quantities in reality (and any divergence from the social optimum).10
The main contribution of this article, then, is to provide a positive analysis of how distributional
rent-capturing activities can distort the prices versus quantities paradigm. The results not only
show that taking political influence into account is vital in explaining regulatory policy choice but
also provides additional reasoning for focusing on distributional conflict. The article shows that
modeling lobbying activity via a distributional conflict approach provides a basis for analyzing both
7See Epstein and Nitzan (2010, pp. 1-6) for a comprehensive discussion and evaluation of these two branches.
8For a collection of seminal papers see Congleton et al. (2008).
9The approach presented in this article is similar to MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2012) in that they analyze distributional
rent seeking over environmental policy rents. Yet in the MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2012) approach the policy level is
exogenously fixed and social welfare is compared among polices. As such, the MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2012) approach
neither investigates the regulator’s policy choice nor the prices versus quantities paradigm, which is the main objective of
this article.
10An exception is Miyamoto (2014), which uses the framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Yet no consideration
is given to the distributional conflict within the political system—the main objective of this article.
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the distributional- and policy-level aspects of regulatory instruments. In this regard, the article
enhances the view that the political economics of prices versus quantities has distributional conflict at
its core. This article establishes a clear link between both branches of political economy literature and
shows how models of distributional conflict can mirror those of the endogenous policy frameworks,
as well as providing a new perspective on how choices within prices versus quantities may misalign
from the traditional normative paradigm.
The article is structure as follows. In Section 2 the economic environment is outlined. In Section
3 the distributional game is detailed for the relevant mechanisms and in Section 4 the politician’s
choice of policy is outlined. In Section 5 comparisons are made between prices, revenue- and
non-revenue-raising quantities. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The economic environment
Consider an economy with an index set of players Ψ = {1,2, . . . , m}.11 Within this population, a
subset of players Φ = {1,2, . . . , n} ⊆ Ψ have their activity restricted by regulation. Let group Φ’s
aggregate cost of regulation be C(q,θ ) where q is the activity restriction and θ is a random variable
with E[θ] = 0 and E[θ2] = σ2. It is assumed that C(q,θ) is continuous, twice differentiable, and
convex in q. For the general population Ψ\Φ, aggregate benefits obtained by the restriction of activity
q are given by B(q), where B
′
(q) > 0, B
′′
(q) < 0, B
′
(0) > C
′
(0) and B
′
(q) < C
′
(q) for a sufficiently
large q.12 Denote q¯ > 0 as the level of abatement that reduces the activity to zero.
The focus of this article is to investigate how distributional rent seeking—the use of resources to
capture rents generated from the regulatory system—alters the prices versus quantities paradigm.
To highlight the fundamental differences, this environment is modeled as a two-stage game. In the
first stage—and similar to traditional prices versus quantities analysis—a politician selects a level
of regulation under the presence of uncertainty {p, q}: either a price level p or quantity restriction
q. In the second stage, players compete for the rents generated from the introduction of regulation.
Uncertainty over the level of costs is realized after stage one but prior to stage two.13
To present players’ rent-capturing activities, the model follows the rent-seeking literature. In
particular, a strategic contest is used to model the appropriation of rents within an economy (e.g.,
Congleton et al., 2008). In a contest, players invest in sunk effort, which will determine their
probability of winning the rent. Formally, the probability of player i ∈Ψ obtaining the rent is given
by:
ρi(κi ,κ−i) =
(
κi
κi+κ−i
if max{κi ,κ−i}> 0,
1
m
otherwise,
(1)
where κi and κ−i , for i ∈Ψ and −i ∈Ψ \ {i}, are the sunk resources used to appropriate the rent.14
From (1), player i’s probability of winning the rent is the ratio of their sunk effort relative to total
outlays. Thus their probability of wining the rent (weakly) increases in their own effort and (weakly)
decreases in rivals’ efforts. One can interpret (1) as player i winning the entire rent with probability
ρi(κi ,κ−i), or, perhaps more realistically, the share of rent attributed to risk neutral player i. Note
that these rent-seeking efforts—although costly to the individuals expending the effort—may be
viewed by the politician as socially wasteful, beneficial or simply a costless transfer between players
in the economy.
11These can be interpreted as individuals or special-interest groups.
12This benefit can also be experienced over the population Ψ without any difference in results.
13This assumption is easily relaxed: if uncertainty is realized after players invest in capturing the rents players will rent
seek over the expected rents rather than the realized value.
14This contest structure is the most commonly used mechanism to investigate rent seeking (Congleton et al., 2008). The
contest can also be extended to include an exponent parameter r ∈ [0, 2] that adjusts the marginal impact of rent-seeking
investments. This has an effect of adjusting the level of aggregate rent-seeking investments. An alternative contest—an
all-pay auction—is also a feasible mechanism. Using such a mechanism results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, where
aggregate expected rent-seeking investments are larger that what is presented here.
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To solve the model the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium solution concept is used, and thus the
analysis begins with stage two.
3 Stage two: distributional conflict
3.1 Price regulation
Let p˜ denote the level of price regulation that was determined in stage one. For a realized level of
uncertainty θ0, denote the level of aggregate activity reduction as h(p˜,θ0), which is derived from
C
′
(h(p˜,θ0),θ0) = p˜. Thus the level of remaining (and taxable) activity is given by

q¯− h(p˜,θ0).
The rents generated from price regulation (tax revenue) are, therefore, given by:
δp˜ · q¯− h(p˜,θ0) . (2)
The rent p˜ ·q¯− h(p˜,θ0) is illustrated in Figure 1(a). Figure 1 shows the conventional prices versus
quantities argument, with the addition that the rents generated from regulation are also altered due
to the realization of uncertainty. In particular, it is clear that the rent is increasing in θ . The parameter
δ is introduced in order to reflect the efficiency of transfers within the economy. If δ ∈ [0,1) then
there is a loss of rent within the economy. For example this could represent a marginal cost of social
funds or bureaucratic friction within an economy.15 Further, it could also be interpreted as a situation
where a proportion (1− δ) of the revenue is earmarked for specific use and the remainder δ is a
contestable component.16 Alternatively if δ > 1 then the generation of this rent has the potential to
be used to provide benefits to some members of the economy over-and-above the value of the rent.
For example, this could reflect aspects of a revenue-recycling effect. That is, public funds could be
used to reduce distortionary taxation for individuals or specific groups within the economy. From (2),
note that the rent (tax revenue) is contestable to the whole population Ψ as all players can invest in
rent-capturing resources to obtain the rent from the politician.
Using (1) and (2), player i’s objective function is given by:
max
κi
ρi(κi ,κ−i)δp˜ ·

q¯− h(p˜,θ0)−κi . (3)
This game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus the equilibrium appropriation effort of player
i, is given by:
κ∗i (p˜,θ0) =

m− 1
m2

δp˜ · q¯− h(p˜,θ0) . (4)
Aggregating over the population Ψ, total appropriation effort is given by:
K∗T (p˜,θ0) =

m− 1
m

δp˜ · q¯− h(p˜,θ0) , (5)
where subscript T denotes price regulation, i.e., tax.17 Equation (5) shows that aggregate appropria-
tion activity is increasing in the population m, the value of the rent δp˜ ·q¯− h(p˜,θ0), as well as the
level of transfer efficiency δ.
15The marginal cost of social funds, then, is represented by a reduction of the gross rent rather than an additional cost
associated with transferring a fixed amount of revenue within the economy.
16Under the interpretation of earmarked revenues, it is possible that the process of earmarking incurs additional rent-
seeking. This is compatible with the analysis presented here as the important link is the interaction between players and
the politician. In such a case, the politician’s rent being diminished due to earmarking can be interpreted as additional
regulatory or legislative checks and balances. It is unlikely that a politician has full control over the entire revenue raised,
thus, in such a case, we would expect δ < 1.
17Throughout this article players non-cooperatively invest in rent-capturing activities. The framework can easily be
extended to include groups. Either one can interpret each player as a specific lobbying group or one can enhance the model
by allowing for an additional stage where inter-group rent seeking occurs followed by intra-group rent seeking or sharing
of the rent (see, for example, MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2012). Similar findings occur. Additionally one must consider how
rents are shared among group members (normally achieved by an exogenous sharing rule). This then usually reduces
rent-seeking efforts.
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Figure 1: Rents generated from (a) price regulation and (b) quantity regulation, for a given realization of
uncertainty θ 0.
3.2 Quantity regulation
Let q˜ denote the level of quantity regulation derived in stage one. For a realized level of uncertainty
θ0, the level of marginal cost associated with q˜ is given by C
′
(q˜,θ0). Thus the total rent available to
be appropriated is given by:
C
′
(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜ . (6)
This can be observed as the hatched area in Figure 1(b). At this point we have to differentiate between
quantity mechanisms that generate revenue (e.g., auctions) and those that do not generate revenue
(e.g., freely allocated pollution permits). Two key distinctions arise. First, revenue-generating
mechanisms have the potential to be contested by the entire population Ψ whereas this is less likely
under a non-revenue-raising mechanism. For example, revenue generated from a quantity mechanism
is usually treated like any other government revenue, such as the tax revenue previously described.
Thus the entire population has the ability to obtain this generated revenue. In contrast, non-revenue-
raising quantity mechanisms, such as freely allocated pollution permits, are frequently contested
only by the population of regulated players Φ. Indeed quantities in this case only provide a rent
to the regulated players.18 Second, the rents generated from revenue-raising quantity mechanisms
may also be affected by the efficiency of government transfer. As both auction and tax revenues are
transferred to the government, the transfer efficiency is likely to be the same, thus it is assumed that
δ is identical for a price mechanism and revenue-raising quantity mechanism.19 In contrast, for a
non-revenue-raising mechanisms the creation of a finite amount of quantity is usually transferred to
regulated entities without efficiency loss, thus δ = 1.20
18It is, of course, feasible that non-regulated entities rent seek for quantities, e.g., environmental groups, but this appears
not to be the case. To include such aspects in the analysis, one simply needs to incorporate a further subgroup of the entire
population Ψ into the game.
19Throughout this analysis administration costs assumed to be comparable for all mechanisms. Inclusion of these costs
does not alter the results of this article. Note that when δ < 1 under prices and revenue-raising quantities, this reflects
inherent bureaucratic inefficiencies over and above any administration costs. Another possible interpretation is that (1−δ)
of the rent is earmarked for use and thus non-contestable. Thus δ < 1 of the rent is contestable.
20It can, of course, include a δ 6= 1 to incorporate cases where the rent can be used to represent regulated players using
the rent as investments, and so on.
7
3.2.1 Revenue-raising quantities
For revenue-raising quantity mechanisms, then, the rent is contestable by the whole population Ψ.
Using (1), and (6), player i ∈Ψ has the expected payoff:
max
κi
ρi(κi ,κ−i)δC
′
(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜−κi . (7)
The equilibrium appropriation effort of player i, is given by:
κ∗i (q˜,θ0) =

m− 1
m2

δC
′
(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜ . (8)
Aggregating over all the population, total appropriation effort is given by:
K∗A(q˜,θ0) =

m− 1
m

δC
′
(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜ , (9)
where subscript A denotes the case of revenue-raising quantity mechanism, such as an auction. Again
we can see that aggregate appropriation effort is increasing in population, rent, and the efficiency of
transfer.
3.2.2 Non-revenue-raising quantities
For non-revenue-raising quantity regulation, it is likely that only the regulated population expend
resources in order to win quantity rents. For example, under the allocation of pollution permits, it is
often observed that polluting firms are the only firms to rent seek for permits. Restricting ρi(κi ,κ−i)
in (1) to the regulated population Φ only, the expected payoff for player i ∈ Φ is given by:
max
κi
ρi(κi ,κ−i)C
′
(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜−κi . (10)
Not only is there a lower level of population incentivized to contest the rent but also δ = 1, i.e.,
there is a direct transfer of permits without efficiency loss. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
appropriation effort of player i is given by:
κ∗i (q˜,θ0) =

n− 1
n2

C
′
(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜ . (11)
Aggregating over all the population, total appropriation effort is given by:
K∗G(q˜,θ0) =

n− 1
n

C
′
(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜ , (12)
where G denotes the case of non-revenue-raising quantity regulation, such as the freely allocated
grandfathered permits.
Table 1 provides a summary of the components for all instruments. For revenue-raising instru-
ments, δ ∈ [0,∞) whereas for non-revenue-raising quantities δ = 1. A clear separation exists over
the composition of rent when either a price or quantity instrument is chosen. The other remain-
ing difference is the number of players that contest the rent, which is higher for revenue-raising
instruments, m≥ n.
4 Stage one: politician’s choice of policy level
In stage one the politician decides on the level of regulation. As the main objective of this article is
to investigate how rent-seeking efforts alter the prices versus quantities paradigm, it is paramount
to identify potential institutional rent-seeking environments. There are four main scenarios of
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Rent Properties
Instrument δ Rent Number of players
Price (T ) δ ∈ [0,∞) δp˜ · q¯− h(p˜,θ0) m
Revenue-raising
quantity (A)
δ ∈ [0,∞) δC ′(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜ m
Non-revenue-raising
quantity (G)
δ = 1 C
′
(q˜,θ0) ·  q¯− q˜ n
Table 1: Comparison of rents among alternative instruments.
importance. First, a politician may be solely committed to maximizing social welfare and perceive
the transfer of rent-seeking efforts as a loss. The most likely interpretation is where the rents offered
to the politician are illegal and the acceptance of such rents generates a negative expected gain due
to the (high) probability of being found guilty of corruption. Second, the politician may still be
committed to the maximization of social welfare but may perceive rent seeking as a transfer between
players in the economy and thus not of inherent social loss. Third, the politician may continue to
view social welfare as an objective but also receives benefits in the form of players’ rent-seeking
transfers. In this case, for example, the politician may place equal weight on the maximization of
social welfare and the generation of rent-seeking efforts. Fourth, the politician may have a sole
objective to maximize the generation of rent-seeking transfers and simply disregard social welfare.
Generating this spectrum of environments can easily be achieved by creation of an institutional
parameter µ ∈ [0,1]. The politician places weights on the importance of social welfare and rent-
seeking activity: the politician will place a weight of µ on social welfare and a weight of (1− 2µ) on
rent-seeking activities. Note that the weight (1− 2µ) is used to reflect the scenario that the politician
can either have positive (µ < 1/2) or negative (µ > 1/2) payoffs from rent-seeking activity.21
Using (5) the politician’s objective function under price regulation is given by
max
p
E

µ
 
B(q(p,θ))− C(q(p,θ),θ)+ (1− 2µ)K∗T (p,θ) . (13)
Using (9), under a revenue-raising quantity mechanism we have:
max
qA
E

µ
 
B(q)− C(q,θ)+ (1− 2µ)K∗A(q,θ) , (14)
and finally, using (12), for a non-revenue-raising mechanism, the objective function is given by:
max
qG
E

µ
 
B(q)− C(q,θ)+ (1− 2µ)K∗G(q,θ) . (15)
In all types of regulation, if µ = 0 this details a case where the politician’s sole focus is on maximizing
rent-seeking effort. If µ = 1/3 there is equal weight between social welfare and the generation of
rent-seeking benefits for the politician. If µ= 1/2 the politician cares about social welfare but also
views rent seeking only as a transfer without any loss to society. If µ = 1 the politician not only cares
about social welfare they also view rent-seeking efforts as socially wasteful.22
21The objective function presented here can be rewritten to balance social welfare (inclusive of rent-seeking costs) and
rent-seeking transfer benefits to the politician. Under price regulation, for example, the objective function can be rewritten
as maxp E

µ

B(q(p,θ))− C(q(p,θ),θ)− K∗T (p,θ)

+ (1−µ)K∗T (p,θ)

.
22As already discussed, δ can represent the revenue-recycling effect. To take into account a tax interaction effect this
analysis can follow Quirion (2004) and allow a parameter to alter the slope of the marginal cost function. In the current
context this would simply result in a redefinition of the cost function, without any significant difference to the results. The
approach followed here is similar to the ‘weak double dividend’ (e.g., Goulder, 1995; Parry, 1995; Goulder et al., 1999).
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5 Prices versus quantities
In this section comparison of prices versus quantities is investigated under alternative institutional
settings. For each institutional setting, we start by investigating how distributional rent seeking
affects the politician’s choice of policy level under alternative mechanisms. Then focus moves to the
primary goal: to provide a positive analysis that assists in explaining why certain policies may be
chosen over others within the prices versus quantities paradigm. More precisely pairwise comparisons
are provided that detail the politician’s payoffs for taxes as well as revenue- and non-revenue-raising
quantity mechanisms. To start, denote ∆TA as the relative payoff difference between prices and a
revenue-raising quantity mechanism, such as a tax versus a permit auction. Similarly denote ∆T G as
the relative payoff difference between prices and non-revenue-raising quantity mechanism, such as a
tax versus grandfathered (freely allocated) permits. Finally, let us denote ∆AG as the relative payoff
difference between revenue and non-revenue-raising mechanisms, such as auctioned permits versus
grandfathered (freely allocated) permits.
Following the literature on prices versus quantities, costs are detailed as
C(q,θ) = θq+
c
2
q2, (16)
where c > 0 is a parameter. The benefits obtained by the restriction of activity q are given by
B(q) = aq− b
2
q2, (17)
where a, b > 0 are parameters.
5.1 Rent seeking as a costless transfer (Benchmark)
As a starting point—and to provide a benchmark—consider a scenario similar to Weitzman (1974),
where the politician’s objective is to maximize expected social welfare. Within the framework
presented here, this requires an additional assumption that any distributional conflict within the
economy is a non-wasteful transfer and simply ignored by the politician. That is, any rent-seeking
activity is a transfer from the players to the bureaucracy, which is redistributed back to the economy
in a lump-sum fashion without any transfer inefficiency. Formally this is modeled by setting µ= 1/2.
Beginning with price regulation, substitute µ = 1/2, (16) and (17) into (13), the equilibrium level of
price regulation is:
p∗ = E

ac+ bθ
b+ c

=
ac
b+ c
. (18)
Thus given the equilibrium price regulation, the level of quantity is
E

q(p∗,θ)= a
b+ c
. (19)
Substituting (18) into (13) yields the expected net benefit of price regulation:
E

(ac− (b+ c)θ)(ac+ (b− c)θ)
2c2(b+ c)

. (20)
Now consider quantity mechanism. As µ= 1/2, it is trivial to show that that there is no distinction
needed between revenue-raising and non-revenue-raising quantities. Thus using (16) and (17),
optimization over (14) (and (15)) with respect to q and solving yields
q∗A = q∗G = E

a− θ
b+ c

=
a
b+ c
. (21)
Comparison of (19) and (21) shows that
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Proposition 1. Let rent seeking be non-wasteful. If the politician maximizes expected social welfare
then:
E[q(p∗,θ)] = q∗A = q∗G . (22)
Similar to Weitzman (1974), the expected regulation levels are identical. For use later in the
article, let us denote this level of benchmark quantity by qW . Substituting (21) into (14) (and 15)
yields the net benefit from quantity regulation:
E

a(a− 2θ)
2(b+ c)

. (23)
Subtracting (23) from (20) and taking expectations yields Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Weitzman 1974). Let rent seeking be non-wasteful. If the politician maximizes expected
social welfare then:
∆TA =∆T G =
(c− b)
2c2
σ2, (24)
∆AG = 0. (25)
Proposition 2 shows a comparative result to Weitzman (1974): if distributional conflict is simply a
non-wasteful transfer within the economy, then it has no bearing on the politician’s preferred type of
regulation: the politician’s relative payoff differences perfectly align with social welfare. The relative
difference is dependent on the variance of the error term and the relative slope of the marginal
benefit and cost functions. Proposition 2 also shows that there is no relative difference between
revenue and non-revenue-raising quantity mechanisms—something implicit within Weitzman (1974).
As will be shown later in the article, however, this result does not hold for alternative—and arguably
more realistic—institutional settings.
5.2 Equal weight between social welfare and transfers
Let us now analyze a more plausible institutional environment; namely, where a politician not
only cares about social welfare but also cares about receiving benefits from players in the form of
rent-seeking transfers. To showcase how the introduction of rent-seeking benefits alters the prices
versus quantities paradigm, let us assume that the politician places an equal weight on social welfare
and rent-seeking benefits. In such a case µ= 1/3. Let us begin with price regulation. Substituting
µ= 1/3 into (13) and optimizing yields:
p∗ = E

acm+ bθm+ c2δ(m− 1)q¯+ cδθ(m− 1)
m(b+ c) + 2cδ(m− 1)

, (26)
which yields
E

q(p∗,θ)= am+ (m− 1)q¯cδ
(b+ c)m+ 2(m− 1)cδ . (27)
For revenue-raising quantity regulation, optimization of (14) yields:
q∗A =
am+ (m− 1)q¯cδ
(b+ c)m+ 2(m− 1)cδ , (28)
and for the non-revenue-raising regulation it follows that:
q∗G =
an+ q¯c(n− 1)
bn+ (3n− 2)c . (29)
Note now that E[q(p∗,θ)] = q∗A 6= q∗G. By comparing the benchmark quantity level qW in (21) with
(26), (28), and (29), we can observe how the existence of a politician’s transfer benefits alter the
equilibrium quantities chosen.
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Proposition 3. Let the politician have equal weight between social welfare and rent-seeking transfers.
• If q¯ ≶ 2a(b+c) then q
∗
A = E[q(p
∗,θ)]≶ qW and q∗G ≶ qW .
• q∗G − q∗A = c(m(−δn+n−1)+δn)(q¯(b+c)−2a)(bn+c(3n−2))(m(b+c)+2cδ(m−1)) = q∗G − E[q(p∗,θ)].
The first component of Proposition 3 shows that the policy levels chosen by the politician—when
there exists a rent-seeking influence—are distinct from the conventional Weitzman (1974) result.
Indeed, it is clear that if q¯ 6= 2a(b+c) the politician will choose a level of policy that will not maximize
expected social welfare. If q¯ > 2a(b+c) , Proposition 3 shows that the policy level chosen by the politician
is, in fact, more stringent than that proposed under Weitzman (1974). The intuition is as follows.
Given rent-seeking transfers are beneficial to the politician, a relatively high q¯ will result in larger
rent-seeking transfers. Thus to maximize expected payoffs, the politician re-optimizes between
rent-seeking transfers and social welfare, and, as a result, proposes a more stringent policy, which
equates the marginal changes in welfare with the marginal change in rent-seeking transfers. It follows
that for cases where the unconstrained level of externality is relatively large (i.e., large q¯), a politician
will choose a relatively more stringent policy compared to one that only maximizes expected social
welfare. For cases where q¯ < 2a(b+c) where the unconstrained level of externality is relatively small,
the politician selects a policy level less stringent that what is desirable to maximize expected social
welfare.
The second component of Proposition 3 compares the relative policy level for the three alter-
native instruments. Note that there exists a difference between revenue- and non-revenue-raising
instruments. In particular, if q¯ > 2a(b+c) and δ < (>)
m
(m−1)
(n−1)
n
then non-revenue-raising quantities
generate a more (less) stringent target than revenue-raising instruments. Note that δ ≶ m(m−1)
(n−1)
n
connects the degree of earmarking/transfer inefficiency/revenue-recycling effect with the population
of rent seekers. We return to a discussion of this later in the article. It is immediately clear, however,
that if the level of transfer efficiency δ is relatively small and q¯ is sufficiently large then the policy
level of a non-revenue-raising instrument will be more stringent that revenue-raising mechanisms.
Intuitively, for the case of revenue-raising instruments, if the value of the rent is sufficiently low the
politician obtains less rent-seeking transfers and accordingly reduces the stringency of the target to
increase such transfers. For the case q¯ < 2a(b+c) , the results are reversed.
We now consider the expected differences in the politician’s payoff under alternative regulatory
instruments. Substituting (26), (28), and (29), into (13), (14), and (15), respectively yields:
Proposition 4. If the politician has an equal weight between social welfare and rent-seeking transfer
benefits then:
∆TA =
(c− b)
6c2
σ2, (30)
∆T G =
(c− b)
6c2
σ2+Λ, (31)
∆AG = Λ. (32)
where:
Λ =
c (m(1+ n(δ− 1))− nδ)2amnq¯(b+ c)− 2a2mn+ q¯2c (m(n− 1)(b+ c) + (m− 1)(bn+ (3n− 2)c)δ)
6mn(bn+ (3n− 2)c) (m(b+ c) + 2(m− 1)cδ) .
(33)
Proposition 4 shows that the relative difference between prices and revenue-raising quantity
regulation, again, depends on the relative slopes of the cost and benefit functions. As can be seen
from (30), if c > b then prices are preferred over revenue-raising quantities. Thus the politician’s
preferences align with social welfare. Note, however, that the relative difference is scaled down
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due to the politician having an equal preference for rent-seeking transfers. One can see from (32)
that there now exists a difference between revenue-raising and non-revenue-raising quantities. The
term Λ has ambiguous sign. Closer analysis of Λ shows if q¯ > a
b+c then all terms are positive except
(m(1+ n(δ− 1))− nδ), which is ambiguous. This is formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let q¯ > a
b+c then ∆AG ≶ 0⇐⇒ δ ≶ m(m−1) (n−1)n .
Corollary 1 shows that the politician’s preference over revenue-raising or non-revenue-raising
quantities is dependent on the transfer efficiency δ and the composition of rent seekers in the
regulated market as well as the whole economy. Note that as m ≥ n then m(m−1) (n−1)n ≤ 1 so that
if a revenue-recycling effect existed such that δ > 1 then auctions would be preferred. Under this
institutional setting, auctions are preferred due to the additional rent-seeking benefits obtained by
the politician. More likely we would expect that δ < 1—as revenues may be earmarked or there
may exist bureaucratic friction—and, therefore, non-revenue-raising quantities are the politician’s
preferred choice. Thus in contrast to the conventional regulator in Weitzman (1974), a clear
distinction arises over the revenue-raising capabilities of quantity mechanisms. This may provide
an additional theoretical explanation as to why we observe mainly non-revenue-raising quantity
regulation, especially at the implementation stage of regulation. Once the politician is modeled
realistically—in that there is a private benefit from rent seeking and bureaucratic inefficiency exists—
then it is clear that a preference may be directed towards freely allocated quantities. For cases q¯ < a
b+c ,
the second term in the numerator now has ambiguous sign. Yet it is clear that the relationship between
the politician’s preferred instrument and the level of transfer efficiency and population of rent seekers
is maintained.
Noting Corollary 1 and comparison of prices versus non-revenue-raising quantities in (31), shows
that non-revenue-raising quantities may even be preferred over prices. In particular, if b > c and δ
is sufficiently small then non-revenue-raising quantities are unambiguously preferred over prices.
In particular, combining Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 reveals that if q¯ > 2a(b+c) and δ <
m
(m−1)
(n−1)
n
then not only are non-revenue-raising instruments preferred to all other instruments, but they also
generate the most stringent level of equilibrium policy level.
Further consideration of (31) shows that a trade-off may exist in that the relative efficiency
from social welfare (first term) is counteracted by the rent-seeking influences (second term). This
occurs in the presence of bureaucratic frictions and b < c. Thus it is clear situations exist where
non-revenue-raising quantities would be preferred over prices, even though—under a normative
social welfare perspective—prices should be chosen (as b < c). Conversely, if b > c occurs then
under a normative social welfare perspective quantities should be chosen. Yet (31) shows that if Λ is
sufficiently large and positive (for example, a sufficiently large revenue-recycling effect and large q¯)
then prices may actually be chosen by the politician in order to obtain rent-seeking transfers.
5.3 Rent-maximizing politician
At another extreme, it is possible that the politician ignores the benefits and costs of regulation entirely
and instead sets regulation solely to maximize the gains from rent-seeking transfers. Substituting
µ = 0 into (13), (14), and (15) yields objective functions that aim to maximize the aggregate level of
rent seeking. Let us begin with the price mechanism. Optimization of (13) and solving yields the
following expected price regulation
p∗ = E

q¯c+ θ
2

, (34)
thus we obtain
E[q(p∗,θ)] = E

q¯c− θ
2c

=
q¯
2
. (35)
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Substituting into (13) yields the expected rent-seeking benefit:
E

(m− 1)q¯δ(q¯c+ 2θ)
4m

. (36)
Next consider the two cases for quantity regulation. Under revenue-raising quantity regulation the
optimal level of quantity is given by
q∗A = E

q¯c− θ
2c

=
q¯
2
, (37)
which yields expected benefits of:
E

(m− 1)q¯δ(q¯c+ 2θ)
4m

. (38)
For non-revenue-raising quantity regulation, the optimal level of quantity is identical to (37). The
net benefit is thus given by:
E

(n− 1)q¯(q¯c+ 2θ)
4n

. (39)
Comparison reveals E[q(p∗,θ )] = q∗A = q∗G , where the equilibrium level of q chosen by the politician
is exactly half of the total possible reduction of activity. Note that even though the politician aims to
maximize rents transfers, it chooses a non-zero level of regulation. Comparison of (21) and (37),
generates a similar result to Proposition 3; namely, if q¯ ≶ 2a(b+c) then E[q(p
∗,θ)] = q∗A = q∗G ≶ qW .
Again we can see that the key determinant of whether the equilibrium level of regulation is more or
less stringent compared to the benchmark case depends on q¯. Note here that the expected quantities
established from these regulations are identical.
Pairwise comparisons of (36), (38), (39), yields the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If the politician maximizes rent-seeking benefits then:
∆TA = 0, (40)
∆T G =∆AG =
cq¯2 (m(1+ n(δ− 1))− nδ)
4mn
. (41)
Proposition 5 shows that ∆TA = 0, i.e., the politician is indifferent between prices and revenue-
raising quantities and is not affected by the relative slopes of the benefit and cost functions: a
clear contrast to the normative prices versus quantities paradigm. The relative difference between
non-revenue-raising quantities and the remaining mechanisms is ambiguous. This difference is
similar—but not identical—to that derived in Corollary 1, in that
∆T G =∆AG ≶ 0⇐⇒ δ ≶ m(m− 1)
(n− 1)
n
. (42)
Again, whether prices and revenue-raising quantities are preferred over non-revenue-raising quantities
crucially depends on δ: the degree of transfer efficiency with the economy. In this case, if the primary
goal is to maximize rent-seeking transfers, then the politician will choose a mechanism that generates
the largest rent: prices or revenue-raising quantities if a revenue-recycling effect exists, or non-
revenue-raising quantities if relatively large bureaucratic frictions (or earmarking) exists within the
economy.
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5.4 Rent seeking as socially wasteful
Let us now consider an institutional environment where the politician not only cares about social
welfare but also the minimization of wasteful rent seeking transfers. In such a case the politician
perceives rent seeking as an additional loss. For example, it may be interpreted as some form of
corruption that generates losses to the politician (an expected loss from taking bribes due to either
a high probability of enforcement or large penalty). For price regulation, optimization with µ= 1,
yields the following price:
p∗ = E

acm+ bθm+ c2δ(−(m− 1))q¯− cδθ(m− 1)
m(b+ c)− 2cδ(m− 1)

, (43)
with the following level of quantity:
E[q(p∗,θ)] = am−δ(m− 1)cq¯
m(b+ c)− 2cδ(m− 1) . (44)
For revenue-raising quantities, the optimal level of quantity is given by:
q∗A =
am−δ(m− 1)cq¯
m(b+ c)− 2cδ(m− 1) (45)
and for non-revenue-raising quantities:
q∗G =
(n− 1)q¯c− an
(n− 2)c− bn . (46)
In the current setup, an interior Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. In particular, for an interior
Nash equilibrium to exist, the following conditions must be satisfied for non-revenue-raising quantities
and prices (revenue-raising quantities), respectively:
b
c
> 2
n− 1
n
− 1, (47)
b
c
> 2δ
m− 1
m
− 1. (48)
These conditions are intuitive: if rent-seeking activity is socially wasteful to the politician, a sufficiently
large marginal benefit is required for an incentive to exist to select a non-zero level of regulation. If
marginal benefits are sufficiently small then the politician would simply not regulate as the process
would generate too much cost (abatement cost plus rent-seeking losses). If b ≥ c then the conditions
are satisfied when n(n−1) > 1, which always holds, and
m
(m−1) > δ. Throughout this subsection it is
assumed that these conditions are satisfied. Thus the following proposition exists.
Proposition 6. Let the politician maximize social welfare and minimize rent-seeking activity,
• If q¯ ≶ 2a(b+c) then q
W ≶ q∗A = E[q(p∗,θ)] and qW ≶ q∗G .
• q∗G − q∗A = c(m((δ−1)n+1)−δn)(q¯(b+c)−2a)(bn−c(n−2))(m(b+c)−2cδ(m−1)) = q∗G − E[q(p∗,θ)].
Proposition 6 shows that when the politician perceives rent-seeking transfers as socially wasteful
then the opposite result from Proposition 3 is derived. In particular, if q¯ > 2a(b+c) then the benchmark
policy level is more stringent when rent-seeking transfers are socially wasteful. Furthermore, non-
revenue raising quantities now result in less stringent polices than prices and revenue-raising
quantities when q¯ > 2a(b+c) . When an interior Nash equilibrium exists—by assuming (47) and (48)
are satisfied—the following proposition holds:
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Proposition 7. If the politician objective is to maximize social welfare and minimize rent-seeking activity,
then:
∆TA =
(c− b)
2c2
σ2 < 0, (49)
∆T G =
(c− b)
2c2
σ2+Γ, (50)
∆AG = Γ, (51)
where Γ = c(m(1+n(δ−1))−nδ)(2a
2mn−2a(b+c)mnq¯+cq¯2((b+c)m(n−1)+(m−1)(bn−c(n−2))δ))
2mn(bn−c(n−2))((b+c)m−2c(m−1)δ) .
From Proposition 7, ∆TA < 0, i.e., if the regulator aims to maximize social welfare and minimize
the social loss from rent seeking then it would implement revenue-raising quantities over prices.
Note further that from (50) the case for prices over non-revenue raising quantities is substantially
weakened as the first term is now negative. The ambiguous efficiency comparisons depend on the
sign of Γ (that has similar characteristics to Λ), which depends on the level of δ with respect to the
number of rent seekers, as well as the level of unconstrained externality q¯.
In summary, what has been observed—regardless of the institutional environment—is that a
distinction between prices, revenue-raising quantities and non-revenue-raising quantities exists when
distributional rent seeking is taken into account. The fundamental determinants of the politician’s
preferred policy options are the efficiency of rent transfer as well as the composition of rent seekers
within the economy and the regulated market. This analysis, then, may assist in explaining how and
how certain environmental policies are determined.
6 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article is to investigate prices versus quantities when the creation of regulation
generates contestable rents. A two-stage process is outlined where, in the first stage, a politician
selects a policy level for either a price or quantity, à la Weitzman (1974). In the second stage, players
invest in rent-capturing activities in order to obtain the rents. The main objective of this article is
to provide a tractable positive analysis of how and why a politician selects regulatory instruments
under political influence and compare this with the traditional (normative) prices versus quantities
paradigm.
A key distinction between the different types of regulation is the way the generated rents diffuse
within the economy. First, non-revenue-raising quantity mechanisms, such as freely allocated permits,
generate rents that are usually only contested by the regulated entities. Whereas rents from revenue-
raising mechanisms (both prices and quantities) are usually collected by the government in which case
centralized rent seeking can occur from the whole economy. Second, for instruments that generate
revenues there may exist transfer inefficiencies, such as a marginal cost of funds, or perhaps a
proportion of the rent has been a priori earmarked resulting in a lower level of rent that is contestable.
Additionally, the revenue may also generate a revenue-recycling effect.
In this article pairwise comparisons are provided between prices and quantities (and whether
they generate revenue or not). This is achieved under a number of institutional environments in
order to reflect realistic bureaucratic scenarios. For example, one such scenario occurs where the
politician’s preferences equally weight social welfare and rent-seeking transfers. Alternatively, other
cases exist where the politician perceives rent-seeking activities as socially wasteful or costless as well
as cases where the politician entirely neglects social welfare. This article provides conditions where,
under bureaucratic friction (or the existence of earmarked revenues), non-revenue-raising quantity
mechanisms tend to be preferred by the politician. This provides additional reasoning for the frequent
use of such mechanisms in environmental policy. A key determinant is the interaction between the
inefficiency of the rent transfer/ earmarking (or revenue-recycling effect) and the composition of
players that rent seek both at the regulated market and economy level.
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The approach detailed in this article bridges the gap between different branches within the
literature on the political economy of environmental policy and provides reasoning why distributional
rent seeking should be investigated within the prices versus quantities paradigm as well as other
environmental regulatory problems.
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